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Security Information

Official Diary

Monday, 8 September 1952

ing: 1. At the Deputies' meeting, discussed with the DCI the follow-

- a. Indicated that we were keeping close watch on all developments connected with the Communist Party reorganization, including the report that Communist Party officials in foreign countries were to reconvene in Moscow on October 15th.
- b. Commented that although the artillery employment in Korea was unprecedented, there were no other significant indications of a major Communist offensive. Nevertheless, we were aware that they had supplies for an eight to ten-day push. The Director agreed that one purpose of this employment of artillery was to equalize casualties; another might be to offset the UN bombing program which was hurting them seriously.
- c. Respecting the report of a revolt in Ecuador, I passed on the view of our people that such an uprising was still possible, although not probable. The principal difficulty seemed to be the position of the junior officers.
- d. Again noted the report of the possibility of a coup in Lebanon.
- e. Called attention to the possibility of some Communist trouble in Mexico, which Aleman seemed to have well in hand.

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2. Spoke to [REDACTED] on the memorandum which he had sent to me respecting intelligence coverage of scientific conferences, and commented that we should have a paper making recommendations as to what was to be done, which could be concurred in by Mr. Wisner and myself. [REDACTED] undertook to have such a paper prepared.

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25X1A9a 3. Following the Deputies' meeting, sat down with Frank Wisner and [REDACTED] to review the situation respecting research support of psychological warfare operations by the Operational Offices. At this time I reviewed with Mr. Wisner my discussions with Fisher Howe, et al., last week and my views respecting the POC proposal. After some discussion, we agreed to recommend to the Director tomorrow morning that both Mr. Wisner and I attend the PSB on Thursday in connection with the proposed briefing on this subject. I had previously spoken to the Director, who indicated that he would accept my recommendation as to whether or not I should be present at that meeting. With respect to the POC activity, [REDACTED] 25X1A9a explained his understanding which was that it called attention to the need of an over-all review of the total Soviet PW effort. On that I briefed Mr. Wisner and [REDACTED] on the proposed propaganda analysis unit

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being set up by [REDACTED] and expressed the view that such unit, as presently planned, would not be capable of taking on such a major research task. As to over-all evaluation of the Soviet PW effort, I raised the question as to whether such an estimate would be valid in vacuo. Our view was that the total activity would have to be taken account of and the PW effort would only be a portion of the whole. This tied in with the suggestion I had heard previously, in which there was much good sense, to the effect that the Politburo itself was a psychological warfare mechanism. At the conclusion of this meeting, it was agreed that [REDACTED] and Mr. Wisner would be briefed by their own people and then we could talk the situation over tomorrow.

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4. Reviewed with the DCI my proposed itinerary and he suggested that we could travel to Tokyo together. The DCI desires that I await further word from him on timing of the trip. He also expressed the view that it would be undesirable to have Mr. Dulles and myself away at the same time. Later informed [REDACTED] of this. In view of the fact that Mr. Dulles will be visiting [REDACTED] the DCI suggested that I might visit [REDACTED] on the way back, as alternates.

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7. At the Deputies' meeting, the Director requested an un-coordinated estimate by the Board of National Estimates covering the following:

- a. The effect of the election of Ibanez in Chile.
- b. The effect of the resignation of Aly Pasha in Egypt.
- c. The implications of a fight between Mossadeq and Kashani.

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I ~~have~~ informed DCI that a project pertinent to the last point had been gotten under way on Saturday. Later requested Dr. Kent to have such a memorandum prepared and informed Mr. Sheldon of the relation of [REDACTED] to the O/CI roundup. 25X1A2g

8. Attended ADs' meeting.

9. Mr. Dulles requested me to attend the NSC Senior Staff meeting for him on Tuesday, 9 September.

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10. [REDACTED] cleared with me a proposed letter respecting the review of individuals being surveyed by the Supergrade Board and also gave me his report on the last meeting of said Board. I approved the positions he had taken.

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11. At the ADs' meeting, the DCI indicated that at some convenient time in the future AD/O might re-submit his request for additional offices for [REDACTED]

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12. [REDACTED] phoned and said that the U.S. Minister in Beirut would be in Washington at the end of this week for a couple of weeks' temporary duty. I called [REDACTED] and requested him to make arrangements for appropriate debriefing by the Board of National Estimates and other Offices. He will contact [REDACTED] for arrangements directly. 25X1A9a

13. Generals Partridge and Porter phoned me with respect to the present status of the project involving a revision of SE-16 and MC-33. It appears that both feel that they cannot postpone the meeting, in so far as the deadlines were set by the Council of Ministers. After talking with Dr. Kent as to our strategy, we agreed to suggest that we would undertake a priority review of SE-16 if they, in turn, would undertake to insure that priorities would not be relaxed on Part II of NIE-64 and supporting schedules. This will involve some relaxation of priorities on Dr. Kent's Western European papers.

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14. Conferred again with Messrs. [REDACTED] respecting the Egypt oil situation and each of them undertook to make available a man in their office for preparation of the necessary factual statement. After this has been prepared, I shall talk with [REDACTED] 25X1A9a

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25X1A9a 15. Conferred with Drs. Chadwell and [REDACTED] and Messrs. [REDACTED] and Reber respecting a proposed revision of Regulation 70, to conform with DCID 3/4. Agreement was reached on a revised form.

16. General Samford phoned and indicated that he would prefer to discuss certain proposed revisions of the summary evaluation of Soviet power to damage the US, before bringing the paper to an NSC Steering Group meeting. I thereupon arranged with the DCI for General Samford to see him at 10:30 A.M. on Tuesday, September 9.

17. Briefed Mr. Sheldon on developments during his leave and emphasized the desirability that he retain control over any [REDACTED] channels that might be created as the result of recommendations of [REDACTED]

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